We introduce a tractable model of endogenous growth in which the returns to innovation are determined by the technology adoption decisions of the users of new technologies. Technology adoption involves an implementation investment that determines the initial productivity of a new technology. After implementation, learning increases the productivity of a technology to its full potential. In this framework, implementation enhances growth, while growth increases obsolescence and reduces implementation. In a calibrated version of our model, the optimal policy involves a subsidy to capital and to implementation and a R&D tax. This policy would lead to a welfare improvement of 7.6 percent. Out of steady-state analysis yields that the transitional dynamics of the detrended variables after a shock to capital are very similar to the dynamics of the neoclassical growth model, but transitory shocks have permanent e¤ects on the level of productivity.
Introduction
Adopting a technology requires an active engagement of the adopter beyond the selection of which technology to adopt. The initial productivity of a newly adopted technology depends on a series of investments undertaken by the adopter. We refer to these investments as the technology implementation process.
There is ample evidence on the importance of technology implementation. Lientz and Rea (1998) recognize that "when implementing a new technology, the current business process is often streamlined and reengineered to take advantage of the technology." 1 Despite its empirical signi…cance, state of the art models of endogenous innovation and growth ignore the technology implementation process. In this paper, we develop a tractable model of endogenous development and implementation of technologies.
In our model, research and development (R&D) activities determine the potential productivity of new technologies. The initial productivity of a new technology and its intensity of adoption are determined, however, by the investments in implementing the technology undertaken by the adopter. Over time, the adopter learns how to use the technology e¢ -ciently and the actual productivity converges smoothly to the potential. This generates a 1 Based on the experience of implementing Plato, an educational software, at over 5000 sites, Plato Learning Inc. has written an eight-point technology implementation guide to maximize the educational bene…ts from the technology. The di¤erent stages of implementation involve (i ) assigning roles prior to adopting technology, (ii ) deciding on program goals, (iii ) deciding how technology will be integrated in production process, (iv ) determining who does what once the technology is adopted, (v ) planning the deployment of technology, (vi) planning technical support, (vii ) training professionals and (viii ) planning the evaluation of the program goals and the implementation process. 2 They use data covering 530 employees from 55 di¤erent departments in 26 private sector organizations smooth di¤usion of new technologies that resembles empirical di¤usion curves.
Including the implementation margin in a theory of endogenous innovation and growth has important consequences for the positive and normative implications of the model. On the positive side, better implementation makes new technologies more productive and leads to a faster adoption of technologies. Implementation, therefore, increases the returns to innovation and, consequently, economic growth. Growth, in turn, a¤ects the technology implementation decision. In particular, since higher growth increases the rate of obsolescence of technologies, growth decreases the return to implementing new technologies at a higher productivity level and thus leads to lower implementation investments. It is crucial for this interaction that both technology di¤usion as well as obsolescence are endogenously determined in our model. 3 On the normative side, the consideration of an implementation margin provides an additional growth policy instrument. Besides stimulating growth through R&D, the policy maker can also consider stimulating growth by enhancing the intensity of adoption. As it turns out, these two policy alternatives have very di¤erent consequences. R&D subsidies stimulate innovation and growth, but, at the same time, increase endogenous obsolescence and thus reduce implementation. Stimulating implementation increases the rate of di¤usion of technologies which in turn increases the return to R&D and thus growth 4 .
The implementation decision in our model determines how far below their potential productivity technologies are operated. When aggregating this gap over the technologies available for production, our model yields an endogenous level of TFP, satisfying Prescott's 3 Endogenous growth and creative destruction do yield an endogenous rate of obsolescence but standard models generally take the rate of di¤usion of technologies as exogenous. This is the case, for example, in
Aghion and Howitt's (1992) model of creative destruction in which technology di¤usion is immediate and in Dinopoulos and Waldo (2005) where di¤usion occurs gradually but at an exogenous rate. Comin (2000) and Comin and Gertler (2006) introduce models of both endogenous di¤usion and endogenous growth but these models di¤er from ours in that the intensitity of adoption is not determined by the implementation investments. 4 Kok (2004) and Sapir (2003) The concept of implementation is similar in spirit to the idea of appropriate technology.
However, where in the appropriate technology case productivity is exogenously determined by the endowments of its users, the implementation decision that we consider here endogenously determines the productivity of technologies, the intensity with which they are used, and the rate at which they di¤use.
One important virtue of our model is that it is quite tractable and yields a parsimonious representation of the equilibrium dynamics of the relevant aggregates as well as closed form solutions for the underlying di¤usion curves that drive the aggregate dynamics.
Our model contains eight preference and technology parameters. Five of them are common to standard business cycles models and only three are new to the calibration literature.
We calibrate them exploiting information on the R&D share in the economy, the productivity growth rate and micro estimates of learning by doing. This calibration permits a reasonable quantitative analysis of our model economy.
We take advantage of the tractability of our model by not only analyzing its steady state properties but also its transitional dynamics. Two of our most signi…cant …ndings on this front are; First, transitory perturbances to the model parameters and/or state variables have permanent e¤ects on the level of productivity. Second, despite having three state variables, the responses of the detrended variables in our model to shocks to the capital stock are very similar to the responses of these variables in the neoclassical growth model.
The steady state welfare cost of the distortions in the economy is 7.6 percent. The policy that restores the …rst best involves a subsidy to capital and to implementation and a tax on R&D. This is in sharp contrast to standard endogenous growth models that do not include the implementation margin.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. We introduce our model of endogenous growth with technology implementation in Section 2. In Section 3, we present the positive results of our analysis by considering the dynamic properties of the decentralized market equilibrium allocation implied by our model. In Section 4, we introduce the normative part of our analysis. In it, we consider the resource allocation that a social planner would choose, compare it to the decentralized economy, and discuss policies that can support the planner's steady state allocation in the decentralized equilibrium. We conclude in Section 5. We leave the mathematical details behind the main results presented in the text for the Appendix.
The model
The model economy that we consider consists of four sectors: a household sector, a …nal goods sector, an intermediate goods sector, and an R&D sector. In this section, we introduce each of these sectors separately. We consider the equilibrium outcome, when they interact, in the next section.
Household sector
The representative household in our model economy is endowed with one unit of time that it inelastically supplies at each instant. It also owns the capital stock that it rents to …rms at a net rate r t : The household selects the path of consumption c t to maximize the present discounted value of the utility ‡ow 
Intermediate goods producers
Each intermediate good is provided by a single producer who owns a patent that ensures his monopoly over the production of the good. Intermediate goods suppliers make two types of decisions.
First, at every instant in time, they decide on factor demand decisions, the level of output, and set the price of the intermediate good they supply. 5 Caselli and Ventura (2000) have shown that, because the growth rate of consumption for a household is the same independent of its level of wealth, the distribution of pro…ts among households does not matter for aggregate household behavior. Therefore, we ignore the issue of distribution of pro…ts across households in our model. Second, at the time they obtain the monopoly right to the supply of the intermediate good, they decide at what initial productivity level to implement the intermediate good's technology. Over time, the producer will learn to produce his intermediate good e¢ ciently and the gap between actual and potential productivity will eventually disappear.
We consider these two choices sequentially. We …rst solve for the optimal factor demands and pricing rule taking as given the paths for productivity, factor prices, and …nal goods demand. Then, we solve for the optimal implementation decision.
Factor demands and price setting:
Intermediate goods are produced using capital and labor that are combined using a CobbDouglas technology of the form 
where denotes the capital depreciation rate.
The pricing and production decisions are static. Given the production and demand functions, intermediate goods producers, therefore, set p it and demand l it and k it to maximize (6) . This yields factor demands that satisfy
and an optimal price equal to a constant gross markup factor, 1= > 1; times the marginal cost of production, mc it . That is (8)
The resulting level of ‡ow pro…ts in each period is given by
and the value of the …rm equals
Aggregation over intermediate goods:
As we show in the Appendix, the …rms'decisions in the …nal and intermediate goods sector
aggregate to a production function of the form
where the aggregate capital and labor inputs are given by
Furthermore, the aggregate level of total factor productivity is given by a CES aggregate of the productivity levels of the intermediate goods:
since this is a power mean of the productivity levels of all intermediates available, we will refer to z t as average productivity.
Firm i's share in aggregate output as well as the inputs is given by
, and
The aggregate factor demands turn out to satisfy the same optimality conditions as the factor demands of the individual …rms in the sense that
This aggregate production function representation allows us to rewrite the value of the …rm as (16)
which depends on the paths of the …rm's productivity level a it , aggregate productivity, z t , the real interest rate, r t , output, y t .
Technology implementation:
Prior to starting production, intermediate goods producers decide at which productivity level to implement the technology they use to produce their intermediate good. 
We assume that learning leads x it to evolve according to
where > 0 is the learning rate.
This learning pattern implies that
Given this path of productivity, the value of the …rm can be written solely as a function of its current productivity level and the paths of aggregate productivity, the real interest rate, and output. That is, the value function simpli…es to
which is linear in the implementation level,
This value consists of two terms. The …rst term is the present discounted value of the …rm's ‡ow pro…ts if it would have implemented its technology at full potential, i.e. x it = 1.
The second term is the loss in value due to the …rm's productivity being below potential on its learning curve.
Firms only decide where on their learning curve to start. The subsequent path of the implementation level is determined by the exogenous learning process. We assume that new intermediates are adopted at the moment that they are invented. This implies that, at each moment in time, the …rm that obtains the monopoly rights to supply intermediate t has to decide on its initial implementation level, x tt . Figure 1 depicts the productivity path, a it , of intermediate i, implemented at time i at level x ii and subsequently converging to a i due to the exogenous learning process.
The implementation cost of good t at time t takes the form
Here, > 0 is the implementation cost parameter and x tt is the initial implementation level.
In addition, z 1 1 t is a scaling factor that guarantees balanced growth, while at zt 1 captures the fact that it is more costly to implement technologies whose potential productivity level, a t , is further from the average productivity level in the economy, z t .
The optimal implementation level, x tt , maximizes the di¤erence between the value of the …rm and the implementation costs
As we show in the Appendix, x tt is equal to
Intuitively, the marginal bene…t of implementation is increasing in the term b xt y t while the marginal cost is increasing in z
The optimal implementation level is therefore increasing in the former and decreasing in the latter.
The resulting value at t of the …rm that produces the last good introduced net of implementation costs, i.e. the value of (22) in the optimal implementation level, equals
R&D sector
Following Reinganum (1989) and Tirole (1988) , we model the R&D process as a patent race.
One patent is awarded to the innovator who, within the instant, develops the intermediate good with highest potential productivity.
Let g t denote the growth rate of potential productivity between the intermediate good developed at t dt and t: That is:
The intensity of research and development determines g t : In particular, the cost of inventing an intermediate good whose potential productivity represents a growth in the technological frontier of g t is equal to
(1 ) z which can be rewritten as
The dynamic equilibrium allocation of resources in this economy can be described by a set of di¤erential equations. In this section, we present these equations, we transform them to allow us to de…ne a balanced growth path and transitional dynamics.
Crucial for the equilibrium path of the economy are three measures of productivity. The …rst is the potential productivity level of the newest intermediate that is introduced, a t . The second is the average potential productivity level at which all currently available intermediate goods technologies can be operated, which equals
The third is the average productivity level, z t . Note that both the average productivity and average potential productivity levels are aggregates that summarize the potential and actual productivities across intermediate goods.
De…nition: The equilibrium of this economy is a path of the variables (32) fy t ; c t ; i t ; k t ; x tt ; b xt ; b 0t ; g t ; z t ; z t ; a t g that satis…es the following 11 equations.
(i) The resource constraint that implies that the …nal good output is either consumed, saved, used for implementation purposes, or used for R&D (33)
(ii) The consumption Euler equation 6 , (2).
(iii) The aggregate production function, (11) .
(iv) The capital accumulation equation
The optimal implementation level, x tt , given by (23) .
(vi) Equilibrium R&D condition that determines the growth rate g t ; (30).
(vii + viii) The expressions for the present discounted value coe¢ cients, b xt and b 0t , given by (24) and (26).
(ix ) The law of motion for a t , (27) .
(x ) The law of motion for average potential productivity,
The law of motion for average productivity, derived in the Appendix, which is
Since c t ; y t ; k t ; and i t are not stationary on the equilibrium path, we transform them into stationary variables before exploring the transitional dynamics and steady state. We do so by scaling them by the average productivity trend z
In addition, we de…ne transformed present discounted value coe¢ cients as
Because our aim is to obtain a stationary representation of the equilibrium path, we detrend our three productivity measures, a t , z t , and z t . This yields the following two detrended productivity measures
Here, t represents the gap between the potential productivity of the last intermediate good invented and the average potential productivity level. We therefore refer to it as the potential productivity gap. The second measure, t , re ‡ects the gap between average potential productivity and the average actual productivity level at which the current intermediates are implemented. We call this the implementation gap.
In the Appendix we de…ne a stationary equilibrium in terms of the 10 transformed vari-
The three state variables of the 10 equation system are k t , t , and t .
Steady state
A steady state of this economy is an equilibrium path on which the ten transformed variables are constant. Let the steady state values of these variables be (42) n e y ; e i ; e c ; e k ; e x; e g; e b 0 ; e b x ; e ; e o As we prove in the Appendix, the steady state exists and is unique whenever
which is the case under the empirically plausible su¢ cient condition that 1 > 1 1
The steady state is determined by the following equilibrium R&D zero pro…t condition where the steady state level of output, y , is determined by the law of motion of aggregate capital and the aggregate production function and equals
The left hand side of (44) re ‡ects the normalized steady state R&D expenditures, while the right hand side corresponds to the normalized present discounted value of the pro…ts net of the costs of implementing a new intermediate goods technology.
Given e g, the optimal implementation level satis…es
, and thus e x = 1
Note that this expression is decreasing in e g. This is because an increase in the growth rate increases the endogenous rate of obsolescence of new technologies. It does so through two channels.
First, increased obsolescence reduces the steady state level of (detrended) capital and thus of output, e y . This reduces the size of the market and the value of the …rm. Second, e g increases the e¤ective discount rate both through a higher interest rate, e r; and through a higher replacement rate of demand by future, more productive, intermediate goods. 8 Both of these e¤ects reduce the marginal value of implementing at a higher level and therefore lead to a lower e x .
The steady state potential productivity gap equals
8 There is a third e¤ect ofg on the e¤ective discount rate. Namely, the positive e¤ect thatg has on the growth of aggregate demand. Our assumption that > 0 implies that this e¤ect is dominated by the previous two and therefore the e¤ective discount rate is increasing ing:
while the implementation gap is (49) e = + e + e x e on the balanced growth path.
For completeness, the scaled steady state levels of capital, investment and consumption are given by the following expressions:
(
Comparative statics of growth and implementation in steady state
Since we focus on the interaction between innovation and technology implementation, we consider next how the steady state growth rate, e g, and implementation level, e x, vary as a function of the R&D costs, , the implementation costs, , as well as the learning rate, . Table 1 summarizes the signs of these comparative static exercises. The details underlying these results are presented in the Appendix.
The intuition behind these results is best understood through Figure 2 . This …gure depicts the steady state R&D free entry condition, (44), as the g-locus and the steady state optimal implementation condition, (47), as the x-locus. The latter is downward sloping because of the negative e¤ect that increased obsolescence has on the implementation level.
The former is a vertical line because we have substituted the optimal implementation level into the value of the intermediate good …rm that appears in the R&D free entry condition.
This …gure reduces the comparative statics of e g and e x to shifts in the g-and x-loci.
An increase in the R&D cost parameter, , reduces the R&D e¤orts of the innovators, for a given x, causing an inward shift in the g-locus, and has no e¤ect on the x-locus. As a result, an increase in the R&D cost reduces the steady state growth rate, increases the present discounted value of demand faced by an intermediate good producer and leads to an increase in the steady state implementation level.
An increase in the learning rate, , makes …rms implement less and depend more on their subsequent learning for a given g. Thus, the x-locus shifts inward in response to an increase in the learning rate. On the other hand, increases the productivity growth rate for the intermediate good …rm thus increasing its value and the return to R&D investments. As a consequence, an increase in shifts the g-locus outward. The result is that, in response to an increase in the learning rate, the steady state growth rate increases while the implementation level decreases.
An increase in the implementation cost reduces the return to implementation for a given g causing an inward shift in the x-locus. It also reduces the value of an intermediate good …rm and the return to innovation causing an inward shift in the g-locus. This means that our diagram, in principle, does not su¢ ce to determine the sign of the e¤ect of an increase of on e g and e x. In the Appendix we show, however, that the downward movement in the x-locus dominates the leftward shift of the g-locus in this case and that both the steady state growth rate as well as the implementation level are decreasing in the implementation cost.
These comparative statics actually provide an interesting insight into the e¤ects of two alternative policies aimed at stimulating long-run growth: (i) subsidizing R&D, by reducing , and (ii) subsidizing implementation and speeding up di¤usion through reducing . Both of these policies will increase the long-run, steady state, growth rate. R&D subsidies, however, come at the cost of reducing implementation and slowing down di¤usion because of the obsolescence cost it imposes. This is not the case for a reduction of implementation costs.
Such a reduction will also increase the implementation level and di¤usion.
Technology di¤usion
Underlying the steady state is a continuous process of di¤usion of new intermediate goods.
Contrary to other models of endogenous growth, the rate of di¤usion of (intermediate good)
technologies is endogenously determined in the model here. This rate of di¤usion can be considered in two ways. 
As we show in the Appendix, on the balanced growth path, this adoption share follows a di¤usion curve of the form (57) S it = 1 e 1 e g(t i) e (e 1) e (t i) for t i
Transitional dynamics
The equilibrium dynamics of the model are determined by three state variables. Thus, analytical results about the dynamic properties are beyond the scope of our analysis. We resort, instead, to a numerical approximation of the transitional dynamics for a speci…c set of calibrated parameter values. The numerical approximation of the transitional dynamics is based on the log-linearization derived in the Appendix.
Calibration:
The parameters that need to be calibrated are listed in Table 2 . We calibrate our model such that t is measured in years. We calibrate the demand elasticity parameter, , and the capital elasticity of output, , to match U.S. income shares reported by CHS. First, labor costs represent 60% of corporate income. Second, returns to intangible capital represent 15% of the price. In our model these are the pro…ts that ‡ow to the implementation and R&D costs.
The remaining parameters are the learning rate, , and the implementation and R&D cost parameters, and . These parameters are chosen to match three observations, the Finally, we use evidence from Bahk and Gort (1993) on learning by doing in U.S. manufacturing plants. In particular, we choose our parameters to match their empirical result that a 1% increase in a …rm's cumulative output leads to a 0.028% increase in its TFP level.
The way in which we speci…cally match the parameters with these facts is described in Appendix A. The resulting values of the parameters are listed in the last column of Table 2 .
Steady state:
The steady state values of the equilibrium variables are given in the 'equilibrium'column of Table 3 . The resulting implementation level is about 4.3%, while the implementation gap is 4.6. The relatively low implementation level in steady state induces the market share of new intermediates to increase at …rst and then to start decreasing after about 10 years. This can be seen from the 'equilibrium'curve in the top panel of Figure 3 . That is, 10 years into the life cycle of an intermediate in this economy the endogenous obsolescence starts to dominate the learning e¤ect. The implied di¤usion curve is plotted as the 'equilibrium'curve in the bottom panel. In the decentralized equilibrium, 50% of the workers produce intermediates that were invented less than 18 years ago.
Transitional dynamics:
We compare the transitional dynamics of our model with those of the standard Neoclassical growth model, explained for example in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) . That is, if growth is exogenous, constant and equal to the steady state growth rate, e g, and if implementation costs are zero, such that = 0, then our model boils down to the Neoclassical growth model with a markup distortion 9 . In particular, we compare the dynamics in response to a 1% deviation of capital above its steady state detrended level. Figure 4 contains the impulse responses for the model with implementation, the 'implementation'line, and the Neoclassical benchmark, the 'NC benchmark'line.
In the benchmark model the excess capital is used for current and future consumption 9 The dynamic equilibrium equations of this restricted model are provided in the Appendix.
through intertemporal substitution. The same is true in the model with implementation.
However, in the model with implementation there is not just intertemporal substitution of consumption. An above trend capital stock increases the size of the market and thus the present discounted value of the stream of future pro…ts. This raises the bene…ts from innovation and implementation. As a result, the above steady state level of capital leads to a transitory increase in the growth rate of potential productivity and in the implementation level and to a permanent increase in the level of productivity. 10 This is the main departure of our model from the dynamics of the Neoclassical benchmark.
Relative to the Neoclassical model, the additional implementation and R&D expenditures seem to come mainly at the cost of investment and not of consumption. What is remarkable is that, in terms of the detrended variables, the impulse responses in the model with implementation are very similar to that of the neoclassical growth model.
Our model has two state variables in addition to the capital stock: the implementation gap and the potential productivity gap. Figure 5 plots the impulse responses to a 1% deviation of the these gaps from their steady state level. For comparison purposes, we have also included the impulse response to capital. Increases in these two gaps increase implementation and R&D costs and therefore reduce both implementation and innovation. The increase in the implementation and R&D costs induce a shift in resources from implementation and innovation to investment in physical capital. As a result, these changes induce very signi…cant transitory declines in the implementation level and the growth rate of potential productivity and an important permanent decline in the level of productivity. There seems, however, to be little or no e¤ect on detrended consumption and detrended output.
Social planner solution
So far, we have focused on the decentralized equilibrium outcome of our economy. Next, we explore the optimal innovation and implementation decisions from the social planner's perspective.
In this section we derive the …rst order necessary conditions for the social planner's problem. We study the steady state implementation level, e x sp , and growth rate, e g sp , chosen
by the planner, and compare them with those resulting from the decentralized equilibrium.
Finally, we show how the planner's steady state resource allocation can be supported through taxes and subsidies in the decentralized equilibrium.
The social planner in this economy chooses a path for (58) fc s ; y s ; i s ; k s ; x ss ; g s ; z s ; a s ; z s g 1 s=t
to maximize the present discounted value of the representative household's stream of utility,
(1), subject to the resource constraint, (33), the …nal goods production function, (11), the capital accumulation constraint, (34), the law of motion of potential productivity of the newest intermediate, (27) , the law of motion of average potential productivity, (35), and the law of motion of average productivity, (36).
The current value Hamiltonian associated with this problem is:
equates the marginal utility cost of a better innovation, i.e. of g t , to the shadow value of the additional potential productivity this innovation generates through a t . Mathematically, this corresponds to equation (61).
(1 )
Distortions in decentralized equilibrium
We characterize the full dynamics of the planner's optimal resource allocation in the Appendix and focus here on the resulting steady state, also derived in the the Appendix. To distinguish the planner's steady state allocation from that of the decentralized equilibrium, we denote the planner's allocation with a superscript sp. 
For a given growth rate, it is higher than the output level in the decentralized equilibrium, because the monopolistic competition between the intermediate goods producers leads to an ine¢ ciently low level of output in the decentralized equilibrium.
The steady state implementation level satis…es
We call this the x sp -locus. It is the social planner's counterpart to (47). This implies that, given the growth rate, the planner's implementation level is higher than that in the decentralized equilibrium for three reasons. First, output in the planner's allocation is higher, therefore increasing the marginal bene…t of implementation. Second, the monopolistic competition also in ‡uences the marginal bene…t of implementation because the …rms that implement in the decentralized equilibrium equate the marginal revenue product of implementation to its marginal cost. The planner instead equates the marginal product of implementation to its marginal cost. Because of the downward sloping demand curves that the monopolistically competing intermediate goods producers face in the decentralized market, the marginal revenue product is less than the marginal product and, hence, these …rms underimplement relative to the social planner. This di¤erence is re ‡ected in the 1= , term that pre-multiplies the squared bracket in the RHS of equation (63). The …nal reason that, at a given growth rate, the planner chooses a higher implementation level than is realized in the decentralized equilibrium is that the planner internalizes the e¤ect of the implementation level on the implementation gap. A higher implementation level decreases the implementation gap and, through that, reduces the implementation and R&D costs. This e¤ect is re ‡ected by the second term in the above equation. We call this the g sp -locus. The decentralized equilibrium counterpart of this equation, which is a rewritten version of (44), reads
For a given implementation level, there are three di¤erences between the optimal innovation condition in the decentralized equilibrium, (65), and that of the social planner, (64).
First, the patent race that determines the R&D intensity in the decentralized economy equalizes the value of the intermediate good producer net of innovation and implementation costs to 0. The social planner, instead, equalizes the marginal value and the marginal cost of innovation. The (scaled) marginal cost of innovation is > 0: Hence, the patent race leads to too much innovation in the decentralized equilibrium relative to the planner's.
Second, the planner internalizes the fact that g leads permamently to a higher a 1 :
As a result, the marginal social value of innovating is higher than the market value of the intermediate good porducer, for a given x, for two reasons. On the one hand, a higher g increases potential productivity levels in all future times. Hence the discounting in the RHS of (64). On the other hand, g increases the growth rate of a 1 by 1 g: Hence, the term 1 that pre-multiplies the marginal social value of a in the right hand side of equation (64).
Because the x sp -locus is above the x-locus for all growth rates, the planner's steady state
can not be such that both the growth rate and the implementation level are below that of the decentralized steady state. Figure 6 adds the planner's g sp -and x sp -loci to Figure 2 . It shows the three possible cases of the planner's steady state compared to the decentralized one: (i) e g sp < e g and e x sp > e x; (ii) e g sp > e g and e x sp > e x; and (iii) e g sp > e g and e x sp < e x.
Supporting the planner' s solution
We do not formally characterize these three cases, but instead describe the policies that support the social planner's steady state equilibrium in the decentralized economy. Such a policy analysis serves two main purposes. First, it allows us to consider how private costs and bene…ts can be corrected to coincide with those in the e¢ cient resource allocation. Second, it helps us understand how optimal R&D policies interact with policies aimed at a¤ecting the implementation and adoption of technologies.
The decentralized and social planner's steady states generally di¤er in the R&D intensity, in the implementation level, and in the saving rate. To align these three margins in the decentralized equilibrium with those in the planner's allocation, it is necessary to use three instruments.
The instruments we consider to decentralize the social planner's steady state are an R&D subsidy, s g , a subsidy to implementation, s x , and a subsidy for capital, s k . These subsidies can potentially be negative, and thus be a tax. We assume that these subsidies are …nanced by a lump-sum tax or subsidy that balances the government's budget. Because of the nondistortionary nature of this lump-sum tax, we do not focus on it in our analysis.
We derive the optimality conditions in the decentralized equilibrium under the subsidies in the Appendix. In order to see how the distortionary subsidies can be used to support the planner's solution, we consider each of the optimality conditions that they a¤ect in the decentralized equilibrium sequentially and compare them with those of the planner's steady state.
Conditional on the other subsidies supporting the planner's growth rate and implementation level, the optimal capital input subsidy is such that
Hence, the optimal capital input subsidy is s k = 1 . This corrects for the distortion induced by the monopolistic competition between the intermediate goods suppliers. In the decentralized equilibrium, this distortion leads to an undersupply of output, a less than e¢ cient level of capital, and thus a lower than optimal saving rate. The capital subsidy increases the private marginal return to capital to o¤set this. (ii) the e¤ect of the implementation decision on the implementation gap and thus on the costs of implementing and inventing. Because both of these e¤ects lead to underimplementation in the decentralized equilibrium relative to the e¢ cient allocation, the optimal policy in this context always involves a subsidy to implementation.
To support the planner's growth rate in the decentralized equilibrium, the R&D subsidy has to satisfy Intuitively, the social bene…ts from innovation are, in large part, determined by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the representative consumer because the intertemporal elasticity of substitution together with the discount rate, , and the growth rate of the economy, is what determines the e¤ective discount rate at which the planner discounts the future gains from current innovation investments.
When the representative consumer has a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution, i.e.
< 1, the planner heavily discounts future gains from current R&D investments. Hence, the e¢ cient allocation involves devoting fewer resources to innovation than the decentralized economy. In that case, the optimal R&D subsidy would be lower than the implementation subsidy and potentially involve a tax on innovative activities.
Conversely, when the agent is more willing to intertemporally substitute consumption today for consumption tomorrow, i.e. > 1, the present discounted value of the social payo¤s from R&D are larger and the social planner prescribes more growth than in the decentralized economy.
Besides the insights that we obtained on how the distortions in the decentralized equilibrium can be corrected using the optimal choice of three policy instruments, we obtained another important insight. The optimal R&D and implementation policies are inherently intertwined. This implies that any policy discussion about stimulating or reducing the incentives to innovate should also take into account the incentives to implement and adopt the innovations.
Quantitative evaluation
To illustrate the planner's steady state, we consider it for the calibrated parameter values of Table 2 . The 'planner'column of Table 3 shows the e¢ cient allocation of resources for the same parameters as the decentralized equilibrium outcome we discussed in Subsection 3.2. For the calibrated parameter values, the decentralized equilibrium would have too little growth and implementation. At 1.38%, the e¢ cient growth rate is half a tenth of a percentage point higher than that in the market equilibrium. Moreover, the e¢ cient implementation level is 6.75%, which is almost 2.5 percentage points higher than in the decentralized equilibrium.
These distortions in the market implementation level and growth rate means that technologies di¤use at an ine¢ ciently low rate. To see this, compare the e¢ cient 'planner' di¤usion curves with the decentralized 'equilibrium' ones in Figure 3 . The e¢ cient 50% di¤usion time in the bottom panel of the …gure is about 16 years, while the 50% di¤usion time in the market equilibrium is closer to 18 years.
The misallocation of the resources in the decentralized economy cause a signi…cant welfare loss. Welfare in the steady state of the decentralized equilibrium is 7.6% lower than that resulting from the planner's allocation. At a constant growth rate, this would amount to 0.36% of steady state consumption. This is more than 40 times larger than the welfare cost for log preferences of consumption ‡uctuations around a linear trend estimated by Lucas (1987).
The optimal policy derived above can o¤set the resource misallocation caused by the model'distortions in the decentralized equilibrium. For our calibrated parameter values, the optimal policy involves a 15% capital input subsidy, a 35% implementation subsidy, and a 7% R&D tax.
These policies are in sharp contrast with the policy prescriptions of standard endogenous growth models that do not include the implementation margin. These generally yield an optimal R&D subsidy rather than a tax, as in Williams (1998, 2000) .
If, in our economy, the government tried to implement the optimal policy ignoring implementation, i.e. assuming = 0, it would choose a capital input subsidy of 15% and an R&D subsidy of 59%. 11 This, however, would lead to a 5% loss in welfare relative to the policies derived above, which represents only a 2% improvement over doing nothing. 11 The optimal policies for an economy without implmentation are derived in the Appendix.
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We have introduced the technology implementation decision in a theory of endogenous growth. In our model, the implementation decision determines the initial productivity of the technology to produce a new intermediate good. The gap between the potential and the actual productivity of the new technology is closed over time through exogenous learning.
Our model is su¢ ciently tractable to analyze not only its steady state but also its transitional dynamics. The addition of a technology implementation decision to an, otherwise, standard model of endogenous growth leads to two important insights.
First, the equilibrium e¤ect of growth on implementation is the opposite of the e¤ect of implementation on growth. An increase of the growth rate increases the rate of endogenous obsolescence of technologies. It reduces the present discounted value of pro…ts and therefore the bene…t and level of implementation. An increase in implementation leads to a more intensive adoption of new technologies and raises the market value of the …rms that produce them. This raises the return to R&D, and thus leads to an increase in long-run growth.
Second, optimal policy in our model does not only involve R&D taxes or subsidies but also requires intervening in the cost of implementation. This suggests that any discussion of policies to stimulate long run growth should not only consider subsidizing the activities of innovators, but, just as importantly, consider subsidizing the implementation, and through it the di¤usion, of the technologies that these innovators create.
The model that we analyzed here is basically a stylized model of the world technology frontier and, as such, the normative results in this paper could be interpreted as applying to a 'world growth policy'. In practice, such policies are not decided on at a global level, but, instead, are chosen by national governments. The consideration of optimal national implementation policies versus R&D tax credits becomes even more relevant when it is done in a multi-country context with R&D spillovers. This is the subject of our future research. Welfare in the decentralized equilibrium is 7.6% lower than in the planner's allocation.
